Report on Toronto's Housing Crisis

Due to difficulties with posting to this blogger site, please follow the link to view the original Google Doc which contains this report. My apologies for the inconvenience.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1k_G4FjKl-OimiehRgmhSiCzxwjU5UoU7iwQProGQLZU/edit?usp=sharing

The history and complexities behind Aboriginal protests against pipelines in Canada

      The following paper will reveal the complexities behind the Aboriginal protests and blockages of the oil and gas pipelines attempting to force entry through the ancestral lands of Native Americans. It will be shown that the various levels of Canadian government involved in the disputes between private development and Aboriginal land claims have conducted their actions based on historical colonial relations that have shaped the narrative surrounding Aboriginal land claims in favour of the Crown. The more recent shift to a multicultural society in Canada will be revealed to show that this cultural development has actually helped to erase the structure of dominance set about by colonists that has resulted in helping to establish their unquestioned sovereignty over other groups residing in Canada.

      For several years now an assortment of petroleum and gas companies have been attempting to build pipelines to connect the oil and gas productions of Alberta with the shipping ports of western BC. Many Aboriginal groups, including the Unist’ot’en Clan of the Wet’suwet’en Nation, have protested the development of their ancestral lands for the creation of petroleum pipelines, however their attempts to defend their land have been hindered by the various levels of Canadian government that as of yet do not fully recognize their claims to the land and have been attempting instead to facilitate industry partners to push through with their projects while, despite the resistance put forward by the Aboriginal groups.

      To understand the rationale behind the Canadian Government in their responses to Aboriginal land claims in the petroleum pipeline protests, it is important to see how their view has developed and been shaped by historical narratives established during the period when Europeans first began to habituate Canadian lands.

      During the Enlightenment period, Europeans formulated theories of their racial superiority and the inferiority of others based upon skin color and geographic location (Egan, 2011). These theories were based on their travels and experiences with what they viewed to be less advanced cultures (Egan, 2011). Out of these theories came two racist conceptions that would be used by Europeans to guide their colonial conquests and justify their treatment of those they subjugated in their settlement of colonized land (Egan, 2011). One of the theories was based upon the simple idea that due to their superior genes, Europeans were biologically blessed with superiority over all other human races (Egan, 2011). This idea was called the naturalist theory (Egan, 2011). The second theory, called historicist, was grounded in the presumption that Europeans were superior culturally as they had progressed further in the development of their civilizations compared with what they viewed as savage and backward behavior along with social and material structures that resembled the Europeans’ earlier states of civilization (Egan, 2011). Most Europeans looked at and justified their actions towards the colonization of peoples due to the thought that these perceived primitive peoples were in need of their progressive ways so that they could transcend their savage lifestyles - whether or not they actually believed what they were doing was to benefit the Aboriginals, they at least proposed that it was (Egan, 2011).

      When Europeans first arrived in Canada they simply traded goods with the Aboriginals, but over time they established small colonies, which soon led to the Crown deciding to make the land theirs; these new lands would need to be made into habitable spaces for further colonists to settle in efforts to grow their European population in these territories ‘discovered’ in British Columbia (Egan, 2011). The European ‘discovery’ of British Columbia was part of a social construct used to provide comfort and stability for the European inheritors of this fictionalized landscape, that would come as settlers to colonize the space after discovery of the lands were sent back to Europe, beckoning others to follow (Egan, 2011). A narrative was created by way of maps and descriptions of the land that held that the spaces were empty and pristine and that there was no opposition to their being taken for the European settlements (Egan, 2011). They had to portray the land as unused and ungoverned to be able to easily assert their own claim upon it (Egan, 2011). It seems possible that the English Crown wanted to establish a case in the event that their claim to this ‘empty’ land was ever questioned by other leading countries that might have pity for the Aboriginals and any legal challenge they might try to pose against this taking of their land.

      At first, land was formally traded in treaties with village leaders, such as when Vancouver Island was signed over to the English Crown in exchange for goods and currency (Egan, 2011). A few of these treaties were carried out, and this provided a record that showed that Europeans recognized land rights of Aboriginals (Egan, 2011). It has been brought to light by some scholars that Aboriginal leaders did not know what exactly they were signing, and have argued that Aboriginal leaders thought they were “peace and friendship agreements” (Egan, 2011: 218). After a few years of purchasing land from Aboriginal groups, James Douglas, the chief Crown official at the time, decided it would probably be easier to just create Native Reserves selected by the Aboriginal peoples, and then all the rest of the land would just by default become the property of the English Crown (Egan, 2011). At first Douglas agreed to quite large reserves of land selected by the Aboriginals to be set aside for their exclusive use (Egan, 2011). However, this land allotment was altered a few years later when Douglas retired and the officials selected to take his place decided to greatly reduce the size of the reserves as they did not have the same understanding and respect that Douglas had come to acquire for the areas of land that the Aboriginals actually used for their livelihoods and henceforth why they had selected it (Egan, 2011).

      Douglas’s historicist racial theory views had compelled him in what appeared to be paternal efforts towards Aboriginals, whereas the new Crown officials likely were guided by naturalist racial theory as they viewed the Aboriginals as “little better than primitive wanderers with little real connection to the land” (Egan, 2011: 219). With these views in mind these newly appointed Crown officials saw the Native Reserves to have a different purpose than envisioned by Douglas and “rather than serving, as Douglas saw them, as a temporary space of refuge for indigenous peoples while they made the difficult journey into becoming part of settler society, Indian Reserves under this new regime were to become spaces of confinement, places to house a dying culture.” (Egan, 2011: 219). The result of this change in attitudes of the Crown’s representatives saw the Native Reserves reduced in size so that they ended up comprising a much smaller share of the land at a mere 0.3% of the total land in BC (Egan, 2011).

      Aboriginals tried for years (they’ve never stopped) to fight for their land rights, using the courts at first until the Crown government made a law against Aboriginals being able to use lawyers for such purposes in 1927, which was rescinded in 1951 (Egan, 2011). After years of battling with Aboriginals over the disputed lands throughout Canada, the position of the Government of Canada lost much of its strength after numerous court hearings had knocked down the myth of the European founding of barren land and established the acknowledgment of Aboriginal rights to the ancestral areas they once lived upon (Egan, 2011). In this weakened state, the federal government decided that the Aboriginal claims should be dealt so that efforts to develop the land could move forward without further disruptions (Egan, 2011). The federal government pushed the provincial government of BC to come to a resolution in regards to the treaty settlements over the protested land claim disputes with their Aboriginal neighbours (Egan, 2011). ‘Reconciliation’ was the term adopted to house these discussions and solutions that were to come out of these new relational arrangements between the two groups (Egan, 2011).

      The Crown wanted to essentially make deals with the Aboriginal groups that would define specific areas that would be legally owned by the Aboriginals in exchange for (1) agreeing to settle for less land than they were claiming was theirs and (2) agreeing to ‘surrender’ and ‘extinguish’ all land claims, now or in the future (Egan, 2011). The government wanted to have specific legal boundaries for land ownership so that they could make their plans to develop their portions without future holdups from concerned groups (i.e. Aboriginal groups) that could pose as challenges, adding increased costs to projects (Egan, 2011). The Aboriginal groups viewed the land differently, and felt that they could not agree to relinquish any parts of their ancestral territory as they view their relationship with the land as integral to their wider identity as Indigenous peoples (Egan, 2011).

      The proposed arrangement offered by the Crown including “about 5% of their traditional territory, approximately $40,000 each in cash, certain limited self-government powers, and assorted other benefits – is simply not enough to entice them to cede their claim and attachments to their larger territories, and to surrender, as Ed John put it, this integral part of their indigenous identities” (Egan, 2011: 224). This new arrangement offered by the Crown had been noted as differing little from the previous arrangement of Native Reserves in that Aboriginals are to live in separate spaces from the rest of Canadians, and still ruled over by a sovereign power unrecognized by the Aboriginal groups it has continued to be forced upon (Egan, 2011).

      For Aboriginal groups, rather than distinct boundaries demarcating land titles, shared usage rights were instead sought after (Egan, 2011). The Aboriginal groups envisioned a relationship that would see their traditional lands shared and presided over by both their appointed leaders as well as government officials of the Crown (Egan, 2011). An open dialog between the Crown and Aboriginal groups was hoped for in an ongoing relationship that would explore and navigate the management and protection of the land as new obstacles presented themselves in the course of time (Egan, 2011). For Aboriginal groups reconciliation should be both coming to understand each other and learning from these experiences in efforts to live in the shared spaces they each hold dear (Egan, 2011). The Crown did not feel the same way about reconciliation as Aboriginal groups did and clearly wanted clarity and finality in treaty settlements, and in this way they appeared to view reconciliation as a divorce between parties rather than a marriage, as some have aptly put it (Egan, 2011).

      This treaty process of reconciliation has resulted in the Crown’s ability to continue development while proceedings drag on slowly (Egan, 2011). As well, Aboriginal group members have been drawn into the Western resource economy through deals that have them as partners with profit-seeking corporations to develop portions of the disputed lands under review (Egan, 2011). So while Aboriginal groups proposed that shared ownership and management of the land would be foremost in their interest, it seems questionable if such an arrangement could actually work, given the increased temptations of Western cultural and economic indoctrination likely to come from the increased exposure between these two groups that would come about from such land sharing arrangements. Wouldn’t these two groups need to first overcome their clearly opposing views, beliefs and respect for the land and wildlife that inhabit it, before they were able to see eye to eye in the joint management and use of shared spaces?

      In addition to direct confrontation with Aboriginal groups through mediation procedures, the Government of Canada also used more subtle ways to undermine the Aboriginal threat to their hegemony and attempt to cover up their past transgressions as settlers in the ‘founding’ of the country.

      The shift to a policy of multiculturalism in Canada beginning in the 1970s with its larger North American discourse of “we are all immigrants” tried to erase the colonial past of the first European settlers (Sharma, 2011). By proposing that European settlers were simply just another immigrant group that settled in Canada, multiculturalist discourses hid the privileged positions colonial powers had constructed for themselves in the rhetoric of a country founded, and still operated on, a system of meritocracy (Sharma, 2011).

      The multiculturalist idea put forth by various white ruling-class spokesmen proposed that various ethnic groups inhabited Canada but had always existed in separation from each other and were best kept in isolation from each other (Sharma, 2011). Further, these ethnic groups, such as Native Americans, were understood as being rooted in the past and were not considered fully in their relational experiences with the colonial settlers when they had first “founded” Canada (Sharma, 2011). These ethnic groups have been continually regarded as best kept away from the rest of Canada, and this has likely contributed to the government’s views over reclamation with its desire for clearly distinct land ownership over ideas of shared rights put forward by Aboriginal groups.

      With the historic colonial narrative now revealed, that has come to surround and underlie the views and decisions put forward by the governing powers of Canada towards the Aboriginal groups that protest its intrusion on their ancestral lands, this paper will now turn to address the environmental concerns of the disputed lands in question from the threat held against them by the petroleum industry in Alberta.

      The proposed pipelines will have to cross multiple wetlands in their path to British Columbia’s coast. These wetlands are not only held dear by Aboriginal groups, but hold tremendous economic value as well for all of Canada as wetlands across the country have been valued at producing $5 to $10 billion a year in revenue (Johns, Sproule-Jones & Heinmiller, 2008). These valuable natural resources are endangered as over the past hundred years over 14% have disappeared from the Canadian landscape due to industry conversion to other uses, primarily agricultural (Johns et al., 2008). Scholars in the past have suggested that this valuable natural resource has been under threat from industry because of the poorly defined roles allocated to government in their stewardship over these landforms (Johns et al., 2008).

      While the pipelines threaten many wetlands throughout British Columbia, many other sources of water are simultaneously threatened. Nearly a decade ago oil and gas production had already constituted tremendous water allocations, using 7% of Alberta’s total water allocations and 37% of groundwater allocations in 2004 (Johns et al., 2008). However, Aboriginal groups in Canada rely on water for more than just physical sustenance, as they have come to regard it as holding spiritual properties as well (Johns et al., 2008). The health of these aboriginal groups requires clean waterways as an integral part of their cultural belief system (Johns et al., 2008). Water is central to many spiritual practices performed by these groups, and furthermore waterways are often found adjacent to hallowed grounds for aboriginals (Johns et al., 2008).

      Of all the petroleum production in Alberta, the development of the tar sands has attracted the most attention. To begin with, tar sands operations are only able to proceed with the consent of the Government of Alberta; 97% of the mineral rights to the tar sands were owned by the Alberta Crown (Carter, 2010). Tar sands encapsulated 140,200 square kilometers spread amongst three main deposits located in the Peace River, Cold Lake, and the Athabasca (Carter, 2010). By 2020 estimates have placed production at around 3 million barrels per day (Carter, 2010).

      Tar sands operations diverted almost half a billion cubic meters of water yearly from the Athabasca River, which was more than double the amount of water used by the city of Calgary (Carter, 2010). With such extreme uses of water, grave concerns have been raised over whether or not basic in-stream flow can be preserved (Carter, 2010). Tar sands operations have left behind tailings “ponds” which were a potential threat to the local habitat as they contained highly toxic pollutants (Carter, 2010). These tailings “ponds” covered more than one hundred and seventy square kilometers, and leeched millions of liters of their toxic waste into the ground every day (Carter, 2010). Tar sands operations also emitted tremendous amounts of air pollution, and have become among Canada’s highest emitters of green house gases (GHG) (Carter, 2010). The tar sands industry has also now become the leader of new carbon emissions for all of Canada, with nearly half of all new emissions from all sources combined (Carter, 2010). In addition to carbon dioxide and GHGs, tar sands operations contributed tremendous amounts of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and volatile organic compounds (Carter, 2010). The combination of all these pollutants entering the atmosphere has resulted in endangering multiple animal species, including wolverine, fisher, lynx, caribou, and numerous species of bird (Carter, 2010).

      The aboriginal communities located near tar sands operations have been impacted greatly by these environmental pollutants (Carter, 2010). Located mainly downriver from these operations, aboriginals in these areas now faced health risks from the potential adverse effects on their food and water supply from the deadly chemicals leeched into the ground (Carter, 2010). Further, the river systems of this area were already prone to drought, and as such are placed at increased risk causing great difficulties for the aboriginal communities that rely on them for subsistence (Carter, 2010). Through airborne transport, the other pollutants in the form of GHGs were spread throughout the country and had made Canada’s climate change goals significantly more challenging to meet (Carter, 2010).

      Environmental concerns over proposals to lease tar sands were conducted by the Crown Mineral Disposition Review Committee (CMDRC) (Carter, 2010). The CMDRC was hindered greatly from imposing any real regulations upon the firms bidding for usage rights due to several factors. The process used by the CMDRC was not formalized in any way, and further was undergone too rapidly to adequately assess the myriad of potential environmental concerns they are tasked to consider (Carter, 2010). Left out of their assessments were any cumulative effects brought upon the environment from the tar sands firms’ operations (Carter, 2010). Lastly, the CMDRC has had no real authority and merely acted in an advisory role to that of Alberta Energy who was in charge of granting land leases (Carter, 2010). Alberta Energy has had conflicting interests in this role, as it was also the main provincial department responsible for the promoting the development of Alberta’s tar sands (Carter, 2010).

      Other departments created within the provincial government, such as Alberta Environment or the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, provided further environmental assessments and information, but they were all overruled by departments higher up who hold ultimate approval and whose concerns were of the financial nature (Carter, 2010). When tar sands firms had broken contractual arrangements in regards to the environment, time and time again the government of Alberta has turned a blind eye to these activities (Carter, 2010). Even bringing to light these infractions made by firms has become increasingly difficult, as the staff tasked with monitoring tar sands firms’ operations have been continually reduced in number while the operations in the tar sands have continued to increase (Carter, 2010). In response to the GHG emissions from tar sands operations the government of Alberta has responded by saying that they expected further increases only until 2020, and by 2035 levels should come back down to those found in 2008 (Carter, 2010). To add insult to injury, these proposed reductions were based upon carbon storage technology that had yet to prove itself (Carter, 2010).

      As to the water withdrawals made by the tar sands industry, the provincial government has admitted it did not know if current expansion of the industry would allow for sufficient flow to the communities and wildlife who rely on the Athabasca River for their sustenance during the winter months when droughts are common (Carter, 2010). It has already been projected that the limits set by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Alberta Environment (who together designed the Water Management Framework) would be breached by 2010 and would continue to increase until 2035 (Carter, 2010).

      The process by which firms acquire leasing rights to tar sands lands were by and large conducted out of view of the public. Public hearings were only conducted if a private landowner or occupants of land could prove they would be negatively impacted from such development (Carter, 2010). Even when this happened, such hearings held little sway as they merely generated recommendations to government that had no legal binding to be carried out (Carter, 2010). Most problematic has been that the cumulative effects by these projects have not been studied by the regulatory agencies, and as such the severity of the environmental problems were not regarded properly in their assessments (Carter, 2010).

      Alberta’s economy has become reliant on fossil fuels as this industry accounted for over half of all revenue by the late 2000s (Carter, 2010). Tar sands would replace the dwindling gas and oil productions and as such were championed as the future of Alberta’s energy production industry (Carter, 2010). With the royalties to Alberta’s Crown Corporation amounting to billions of dollars every year, the provincial government has overlooked the environmental concerns raised by the industry’s operations and instead has offered tax breaks and subsidies to the research and development of the industry (Carter, 2010). Multi-million dollar advertising campaigns have been launched since 2008 to counter the negative image garnered by Alberta and their tar sands environmental woes (Carter, 2010). On top of this, the provincial and federal governments of Canada have been active in multiple cover-ups, as they’ve attempted to withhold damaging environmental reports from reaching the media (Carter, 2010).

      The tar sands industry’s well-funded lobbyists have been busy voicing their concerns to government in their attempts to curb regulations that they say hindered the expansion of their operations (Carter, 2010). The oil and gas industry have succeeded in that calls for reductions in their operations’ emissions have been curtailed with only voluntary measures pushed forward by regulatory agencies (Carter, 2010). To stem the discontent of citizens, the lobbyists employed millions of dollars in building community projects such as performing arts centers and hospitals, as well as large donations to local universities and colleges (Carter, 2010).

      In conclusion, we have now seen how the portrayal often given by the media as to the Aboriginal standoffs in land disputes and their protests to the pipeline developments are limited in their coverage and do not reveal the complex history that has developed over time to shape these issues. It is now clear that the actions put forth by the governments of Canada were deeply rooted in the past and had been built up and continually shaped by the colonial powers in their capitalist hunger for continued growth with themselves at the helm in privileged positions to reap the greatest gain from any and all economic developments. The actions taken by the Aboriginals can now properly be viewed as not the violent threats of an unruly group of anarchists, but rather as the admirable fight over a dominant aggressor for their own voices to be heard and acknowledged in the sovereignty of the land they have long resided over responsibly and productively.  

      In an ironic twist of fate, it has been the colonialist Europeans who turned out to be the godless heathens, morally depraved and irresponsible in their development of the land. The colonialists’ shortsighted governance over the development of the land is much more representative of a ‘savage’ culture they attributed to that of Aboriginals, a people guided by animal instincts rather than reason.

      Despite boasting to have a superior, culturally-evolved, civilization, more capable of governing then the Aboriginals they encountered, the Government of Canada has shown that this was indeed not the case, as the current state of the Native Reserves clearly indicates (Stastna, 2014). The Native Reserves erected by the Government of Canada, along with the governing policies imbued in them, have clearly degraded the quality of life of the Aboriginals who are housed within them. Further, these Native Reserves have reduced Aboriginals’ skill sets and cultural capital through the corrupting influences that have been transmitted from their forced proximity to a capitalist culture of deprivation, inequality, and shortsighted material gains. The physical structures now face disrepair, and squalid conditions surround much of the landscapes contained within the Native Reserves we have essentially forced Aboriginals to live in (Stastna, 2014).  

      And while the state of Native Reserves is deplorable at best, even our governments’ actions over Aboriginals outside the Reserve confines have shown to be greatly wanting. The result has been that Aboriginals have become an overrepresented group in the homeless populations of urban centers (Gaetz, Donaldson, Richter & Gulliver, 2014), which clearly points to our failures in incorporating this group of people into our supposedly more ‘evolved’ society. It would appear that it is (and always was) time for our acknowledgement of this group’s position, and that we should place far greater effort to seek out and incorporate the input of the Aboriginal groups in the processes we design to aid their members in living however they wish to in this country we share. Clearly this group needs to be allowed the agency they deserve in guiding their own development and livelihoods as they see fit. The Government of Canada should aid them to do this, as this governing power is quite evidently indebted to this group for the destruction wrought by their unscrupulous misguided ancestors in the founding of the nation.

References

Carter, Angela (2010). Regulating the Environmental Impacts of Alberta’s Tar Sands. Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies Working Paper: Energy Series (Working Paper).

Egan, Brian (2011). Resolving “the Indian Land Question”? Racial Rule and Reconciliation in British Columbia. In Rethinking the Great White North: Race, Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada (Andrew Baldwin, Laura Cameron and Audrey Kobayashi, eds.). Vancouver: UBC Press. Pgs. 211- 232.

Gaetz, S., Donaldson, J., Richter, T., & Gulliver, T. (2013). The State of Homelessness in Canada. Homeless Pub Paper #4, Toronto: Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press. Retrieved March 22, 2014 from http://www.homelesshub.ca/ResourceFiles/SOHC2103.pdf

Johns, Carolyn; Mark Sproule-Jones; B. Timothy Heinmiller (2008). Water as a Multiple-Use Resource and Source of Political Conflict. In Canadian Water Politics: Conflicts and Institutions. McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal. Pgs. 19-57.

Sharma, Nandita (2011) Canadian multiculturalism and its nationalisms, in Home and Native Land: Unsettling Multiculturalism in Canada (May Chazan, Lisa Helps, Anna Stanley, Sonali Thakkar, eds.). Toronto: Between the Lines. Pgs. 85-101.

Stastna, K. (April 12, 2014). Shacks and slop pails: infrastructure crisis on native reserves. CBC News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/shacks-and-slop-pails-infrastructure-crisis-on-native-reserves-1.1004957

Comparing the theories and policies behind both automobile use and bicycle use

     The following paper will explore the theories and policies behind both automobile use and bicycle use. The paper will examine the underlying theories of what makes drivers choose to drive, while also shedding light on what implements are able to compel people to ride bicycles. In the second part of the paper, policies from around the world will be examined in contrast to Toronto’s, helping us to see if Toronto is headed down the right road in its professed desire to decrease automobile use and promote active transport for it citizens (Strategic Plan, 2013).

      Health care costs attributed to inactivity and obesity have skyrocketed in the GTHA, with estimates placing the amount as high as $4 billion per year (TPH, 2013). Active transport has been cited as a means to achieve the daily exercise required in combating the plethora of diseases that inactivity causes, as well as lowering the risks of obesity (TPH, 2013). On the opposite end, car use has been associated with increased levels of obesity, as well as contributing to air pollution, which has been estimated in causing upwards of $2 billion dollars a year to the GTHA in health care costs (TPH, 2013). While exercise is the key to avoiding these diseases caused from inactivity, studies have found that individuals have a much better chance of sticking to a daily exercise routine when it is incorporated into active transportation (Cole, Burke, Leslie, Donald & Owen, 2010).

      To reduce the use of automobiles and promote active transport there are a number of proposed solutions, such as building more compact, mixed-use developments, or increasing public transit coverage. Both of these efforts are expensive or nearly impossible to implement depending on the specific area in question. Promoting bicycling is a much cheaper and easier method to filling the role currently held by the automobile. Bicycling can work with existing public transit to bring travelers the last mile of their journeys, or for others it can provide the only means of transport necessary for entire trips. Car use is linked with bicycle use in two ways. Studies have found that many potential cyclists are deterred because of car traffic on roads (Parkin, Wardman & Page, 2008). People have also shown to be much less likely to ride bicycles once a car has been purchased, a trend that has been increasing in North America since 2001 (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011). As well, considering transit users have been shown to use various forms of active transport, such as bicycling, and considering that people in Toronto area are clearly more comfortable using public transit than bicycling, it would seem that the most plausible solution to reduced car use and increased bicycle use would be to come up with deterrents to car use that would at the same time promote the adoption of public transit in its place. Then by providing more attractions to bicycling, there would be fewer drivers on the road, as well as transit users in need of vehicles to take them the last mile of their journeys.

Theories For Automobile Use

      To begin with people will often misjudge the cost of using owning an automobile as the costs associated with this are spread out over the duration of ownership in a variety of areas such as upkeep, parking, and fuel consumption (Innocenti, Lattarulo & Pazienza, 2012). Once a car is purchased, it rapidly becomes a necessity and the feeling is reinforced over time (Cullinane and Cullinane, 2003).

      It appears that people over time will increasingly be unable to process travel information regarding their transit options for a given trip due to travel mode patterns setting in and biasing their judgment (Innocenti, Lattarulo & Pazienza, 2012). At this point travel habits often take over and guide all decisions in subsequent trips (Innocenti, Lattarulo & Pazienza, 2012). Moreover, other studies have shown that many drivers actually enjoy the time spent in their vehicles (Poudenx, 2008), which biases them further from being able to rationally consider the best travel options available to them (Innocenti, Lattarulo & Pazienza, 2012).  

      With these entrenched preferences built up over time for automobiles, other opinions are consequently formed for other modes of transportation. Studies conducted by Beira & Sarsfield Cabral (2007) found that people who are not familiar with using transit typically hold negative opinions of such services, and so choose to drive over taking transit as they consider it a far superior option. This has led to automobile drivers forming misconceptions about their actual travel times when using their vehicles, and further attribute much longer travel times for public transit under false perceptions of the extent of time such users waste as they wait for buses to arrive, as drivers often assume that public transit is unreliable (Van Exel and Rietveld, 2009).

      When drivers actually do try using public transit, their negative opinions and false assumptions are laid to rest; research by Outwater, Spitz, Lobb, Campbell, Sana, Pendyala & Woodford (2011) has revealed that once a former automobile user becomes comfortable and accustomed to the schedule and routine of using public transit, many would consider switching travel modes. The added relaxation of not having to navigate a vehicle through traffic was further cited as a benefit that was revealed to former drivers once they were able to adjust to using public transit (Outwater et. al., 2011).

      The trouble it seems is persuading drivers to actually try using public transit, as studies have shown that potential transit users will likely only search out information regarding public transit, such as schedules and route locations, if they are already willing to use public transit (Farag & Lyons, 2010). As such, it seems clear that incentives or disincentives are needed to push drivers out of their cars to try out transit, as they are unlikely to do so on their own volition.

      Further exacerbating the modal preference for the automobile is the workplace. Studies by Van Exel and Rietveld (2009) reveal that when commuters are subsidized by their employers they are much more likely to only consider using an automobile for their travels, which highlights the importance that employers have in the transit mode choice of their employees. This further suggests that perhaps local policy makers should consider offering incentives for companies to promote public transit use with their travel subsidies (Van Exel and Rietveld, 2009).

      Lastly, the modal choice of automobiles is of course greatly effected by having a place to park once you've arrived at your destination; a study by Kenworthy & Laube (1996) found that creating parking spaces in cities increases car use while at the same time reducing the ridership levels for public transit.

      While studies have shown that increasing fuel prices has the effect of switching a relatively small amount of drivers into transit users (Haire & Machemehl, 2007), artificially raising fuel costs through taxes has proved to be a very politically contentious issue for North American governments.

Theories For Bicycle Use

      While automobile use has been previously cited as having increasingly habitual tendencies, so too does active transport. Studies have revealed that commuters who use public transit, walk, or bicycle are much more likely to also choose active transport for other activities such as dining out, grocery/miscellaneous shopping, and other such utilitarian purposes (Lachapelle & Noland, 2012). This is great news for people who already bicycle, however the problem that remains is how to get more people out riding their bikes.

      People seem to be much more willing to bike if they have their own designated lanes to ride on as studies have found that after controlling for multiple variables, increases in cycling are realized as the amount of bike lanes/paths are increased (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011). Experiences from London have shown that adding bike lanes throughout the city has decreased the number of cycling accidents while simultaneously encouraging 58% more people to cycle in the 3.5 years since the bike lanes were installed (Pucher, Dill & Handy, 2010).

      But bike lanes/paths are only the beginning as studies by Rietveld & Daniel (2004) have found that bicycling is made even more attractive as a transit mode if direct routes with fewer barriers to continual travel are created, as reduced travel time has been indicated as a determinant of whether cycling would be considered among the options available. The placement and condtion of these lanes/paths are also important as studies by Parkin, Wardman & Page (2008) have found that degraded roads containing potholes or other obstructions, as well as roads that carry a high volume of automobile traffic, are both deterrents to bicycling activity.

      While bicycle lanes/paths are key to encouraging cyclists out onto the roads, intersections can often pose great risks for accidents to occur between automobiles and cyclists, thus discouraging people from cycling. Change is on the way it appears, as cities in Europe over the past few years have been implementing bike specific traffic lights. One study by Korve and Niemeier (as cited in Pucher, Dill & Handy, 2010) found that by installing traffic signal phases for bicyclists, the intersection in question went from having 10 auto-bicycle collisions in the prior 35 months to having none 35 months later.

      Another area that needs to be considered in attracting potential cyclists is how to accommodate them once they’ve arrived at their destinations. If cycling is to become a serious competitor for the automobile, the commute into work needs to be addressed, which will likely be deterred if someone is to become drenched in sweat and if there is no place to store their bikes away from the elements in case of changing weather conditions throughout the workday. These needs have been noticed as studies have found that constructing showers and indoor bike parking increases the number of cyclists in an area (Wardman, Tight & Page, 2007).

      Aside from infrastructure, increasing the actual amount of available bicycles is of great importance to further reduce the deterrents to its uptake. Studies have found that bike-sharing programs have increased the number of cyclists in the cities in which they exist (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011).

      Once these aforementioned implementations have been created there is good reason to believe that bicycling will slowly propel itself into a greater and greater mode share once a certain threshold is passed in the number of cyclists on the roads. There have been correlations shown in cities between the higher bike use and higher safety for bicyclists, which has been interpreted as a ‘safety in numbers’ scenario; increases in the amount of cyclists on the road creates greater safety for them (likely from motorists becoming more familiar with watching out for them as they drive), and as the streets become safer for cyclists it attracts more people to engage in this mode of travel (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011).

Policies For Automobile Use

      Overall, Europe has made driving less attractive than Canada by increasing the costs of driving. This has resulted in gasoline prices to be nearly twice the amount compared with Canada, with very high fuel taxes responsible for nearly all of the difference (Pucher & Buehler, 2006). As well, licensing, vehicle registration, and vehicle purchase taxes are all priced much higher as well. Parking is also much less in abundance in European cities than in Canadian cities (Pucher & Buehler, 2006).

      Germany has been at the forefront in making private automobiles less attractive by greatly increasing their costs. Drivers in Germany pay 2.5 times the actual cost of roadways (Buehler & Pucher, 2012) compared with drivers in Ontario who have been estimated as paying about equal to the costs incurred (Babbage, 2013). Germany goes even further to diminish the role of the automobile where its cities are concerned, by establishing car free zones, segregating most roadways to the outer boundaries, and by reducing parking spots while increasing prices charged (Buehler & Pucher, 2012).

      Asian cities have also made substantial efforts to inhibit the use of automobiles. Singapore instituted a number of measures to curb automobile use beginning in the 1970s, which included costly licenses to drive in the city, high taxes on automobile purchases, high parking charges, registration fees, and expensive import duties (Poudenx, 2008). While these policies did bring reductions in rush hour traffic by as much as 45%, and further reduced the number of accidents by 25%, on top of providing funds for an expansive public transit network built in 1987, car demand continually went up (Poudenx, 2008). In 1990 the right to buy a car was turned into an auction, with a limited number of certificates made available each year (Poudenx, 2008). This eventually had the effect of pricing a Toyota Corolla at US$64 900, which only a third of the population could afford (Poudenx, 2008). Further, electronic road tolls were introduced in 1997, and together these policies helped to reduce traffic on roads by 40% and sped up public transit vehicles by 16% (Poudenx, 2008).

      Back in Canada, such radical policies against automobile use seem highly unlikely, despite much rhetoric tossed about by local administrations. Although in Toronto’s official plan it clearly states that reducing the dependency of car use by implementing Travel Demand Management measures is a sought after goal (Official Plan, 2010), it seems difficult to see just how much has actually been done to accomplish this, as increasing the cost of driving in Toronto has been proven to be quite difficult. One example being increasing fuel taxes, which has proven to be politically unpalatable as recently Ontario’s Premiere Kathleen Wynne has removed this option that was posed as a recommendation among many to help fund the upcoming Big Move transportation plan that has yet to take root (Morrow, 2014). As well, in 2010 just after the new mayor Rob Ford took office, Toronto’s vehicle registration tax was repealed (Doolittle, 2010).

      Another way of deterring automobile use is to decrease the amount of parking available to vehicles, as ample parking in cities leads to more car use, a point mentioned earlier in this paper. Some US cities have been engaging in this method. In Portland, Oregon, for example, local officials have removed all parking requirements for any sites within 500 feet of public transit that has a minimum of 20-minute rush hour service (Engel-Yan & Passmore, 2010). Even automobile-dependent Los Angeles has instituted reductions in its minimum parking requirements allowing just 0.5 spots per affordable housing unit, and further reductions if sites are within 1, 500 feet of rapid transit routes (Engel-Yan & Passmore, 2010). For decades now, Toronto has been subsidizing the costs of parking with the plethora of cheap municipally-owned Green P parking spaces that offer below-market rates, as well as upholding the current by-law that restricts all on street parking spaces to no more than $3.50 per hour (McGrath, 2011). However, there has been some positive change as of late to Toronto’s parking policies. In 2013 City Council altered some of the by-laws surrounding the levels of required parking for buildings by lowering the minimums in some key areas (Very, 2013). One area is that of grocery stores, retail, and restaurants of sizes smaller than 200 square meters no longer require any mandatory parking spaces (Very, 2013). Under the old by-law this same size spaced would have required 21 parking spots, so this would appear to be of significance in Toronto’s push to relinquish cars from the city (Very, 2013).

      Private parties have also been at work in reducing the amount of parking offered in Toronto as developers over the past few years have been starting a new trend in building condominiums without parking spaces, or in other cases offering significantly fewer spots (Mills, 2013). City by-laws require certain amounts of parking for such structures; developers have just been choosing to ignore such policies, taking their chances that the city will be persuaded later, and many it seems have had success thus far (Mills, 2013). Developers often cite lack of car ownership and locations well served by transit, but residents of the areas are protesting these decisions, complaining that the precious few parking spots on their streets will be used instead, causing them to have to park further away (Mills, 2013).

      Lastly, there has even been hope of outright automobile bans in certain parts of Toronto. The idea of prohibiting all vehicles from King Street during rush hours has been entertained by TTC officials and endorsed by various city council members (Alcoba, 2013). A pilot of the proposed ban during the Pan Am games in 2015 has been suggested by councilor and TTC chair Karen Stintz, but whether this will actually happen is doubtful considering that there actually already exists a ban on portions of King Street, east of Jarvis and west of Spadina, during rush hours, although police have chosen not to enforce the policy (Alcoba, 2013).

Policies For Bicycle Use

      In Canada, unlike Europe or the US, no federal level funding is made available for the creation of cycling infrastructure (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011). Federal funding has been key for many European countries to establish their extensive cycling infrastructure. From 1980 to 2000, Germany spent over a billion euros doubling bikeways along its highway system, and since then has earmarked around 2 billion euros a year from what it collects in fuel taxes to match 70-85% of local bicycling infrastructure initiatives throughout the country (Pucher & Buehler, 2008). Germany’s cycling infrastructure expenditures have helped to vastly increase the lengths of their cities bike lanes/paths. Berlin, a city with approximately 50% more people and land, but containing roughly the same proportions in population density as Toronto, has constructed the times more bicycle paths/lanes than Toronto (Pucher & Buehler, 2008). While Toronto has roughly 11 km of bike paths/lanes per 100,000 people (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011), the German city Muenster has 13 times this amount at 115 km per 100,000 citizens, despite that its ¼ the density of Toronto (Pucher & Buehler, 2008). The Netherlands have also been busy as they doubled their bicycling lanes/paths from 9282 km in 1978 to 18 948 km by 1996 (Pucher & Buehler, 2008). European cities such as Copenhagen and Amsterdam have created approximately 400 km each of completely separated bike lanes/paths, despite their much smaller populations of 504 000 and 735 000 respectively (Pucher & Buehler, 2008), compared with Toronto’s much larger population of 2,615,060 with only 281 km (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011). These vastly superior bicycling networks have helped these cities to climb to the high bike modal shares they now command: 27% in Amsterdam, 29% in Copenhagen, 10% in Berlin, 27% in Munster (Pucher & Buehler, 2008), compared with only 0.8% in Toronto (Pucher & Buehler, 2006). Car ownership differences between these European cities and Toronto are not to account for these differences, as they are all quite similar: there are roughly 457 cars per 1000 in the GTA (Wong, 2004), 413 for Amsterdam (City of Vienna, 2013), 394 for Copenhagen (Statistical Yearbook, 2012), 576 for Munster, and 360 for Berlin (Scheiner, 2012). Nor are safety levels between these two countries as Canada actually has slightly less fatalities per 100 million km cycled than Germany does - 2.39 vs. 2.43 (Pucher & Buehler, 2006). Even within North America Toronto has been shown to be slow in its creation of bike lanes/paths. Chicago, a city that is nearly identical in population, size, and density, built 54 kilometers in 2013, while during this same period Toronto was bale to construct just 2.4 kilometers (Kolb, 2014)

      As was mentioned earlier, traffic calming has been shown to encourage cycling activity. While Toronto does have a few traffic-calmed neighbourhoods, Vancouver has many more, and both cities greatly trail Europe in their adoption (Pucher, Buehler & Seinen, 2011).

      Toronto has, however, made significant headway in at least one aspect to promoting bicycling in its city, namely providing plenty of parking through its installations of nearly 15,000 bike posts scattered throughout the city (with an additional 1000 or so per year), as well as installing bike parking infrastructure at most of its railway stations (Pucher & Buehler, 2006). Further to Toronto’s credit, the city has created a cycling promotion initiative called the Cycling Ambassador outreach program, which teaches skills courses and bicycle safety by expert cyclists, and some schools offer optional training on bicycle safety, though it is limited in its scope (Pucher & Buehler, 2006). While this is definitely a start, it is still not as good as many countries in Europe, such as in Germany, The Netherlands and Denmark, who all provide their children extensive bicycle training as part of their school’s curriculums before they reach grade 4 (Pucher & Buehler, 2008). All of these implements have no doubt helped these European countries to achieve very high percentages of bicyclists, as Germany has 10%, The Netherlands 27%, Denmark 18%, and Canada a mere 2% (Pucher & Buehler, 2008). Comparisons between these European countries and Canada are strengthened as they all have average incomes roughly equivalent to each other (OECD, 2012), along with population densities in the European countries mentioned being far lower than those found in the GTHA. These European countries are further made comparable as their levels of car ownership are roughly equivalent (World Bank, 2013), as Denmark has 480 cars per 1000 inhabitants, Germany 572, The Netherlands 527, while the GTA only has around 457 (Wong, 2004).

      While Toronto may be lacking in its amount of bike lanes/paths, it has been active in increasing the number of bicycles available for its citizens. Toronto’s bike sharing program, named Bixi, came to the city in 2011, but has had difficulties paying off its loan it had received from the city since it began (Bowerman, 2013). Toronto city council has thankfully voted to save the company by paying off its remaining debt, and is now looking into expanding the program as many had cited the low number of bikes (1000) and centrally located stations as limiting the potential success of the program (Bowerman, 2013).

      Politics have played a substantial role in Toronto’s adoption of bicycle friendly policies, as well as their timelines. Toronto’s mayor Rob Ford and his brother councilor Doug Ford have voiced their opinion numerous times of their love of the automobile. Recently they even went so far as to insult Toronto’s medical officer of health, Dr. David McKeown, after he made recommendations of reducing speed limits throughout Toronto (Warzecha, 2012). The Chief Coroner of Ontario further trumpeted these same recommendations as he conducted a study that found by reducing speed limits from 50 km/h to 30 km/h, mortality rates from crashes can be reduced by 80% (Kolb, 2014).

      Since mayor Rob Ford has come into office he has removed bike lanes from Jarvis Street, Birchmount Road, and Pharmacy Avenue, while upgrading the Sherbourne lanes into separated tracks (Kolb, 2014). However, aside from removing lanes, the city has also been slow to create any new ones. Back in 2011 Toronto’s city councilors voted to install bike lanes on Bloor Street East, from Sherbourne Street to Broadview Avenue, as well as on Wellesley Street, Harbord Street, Hoskins Avenue, with further studies to commence as to the feasibility of separated lanes on Richmond Street and Adelaide Street. None of this has even begun (Kuitenbrouwer, 2013).

      One of the most sought after streets to install a bike lane has been on Bloor Street. City council has debated for years on what to do about this street, and in 2011 put on hold a study of what the impact of bike lanes would do to the street until further notice (Dale, 2013). But now it seems the council members are ready to look at the project once again (Dale, 2013), although opposition exists between committee chair Councillor Denzil Minnan-Wong and Councillor Adam Vaughan, who oppose each other’s bike lane locations – Vaughan has voiced concern over the creation of them in his ward (Kuitenbrouwer, 2011), and Minnan-Wong doesn't think bike lanes belong on Bloor Street (Dale, 2013).

      Aside from city council’s mood shifts, there does appear to be hope for Toronto’s cyclists. Recently Toronto acquired Stephen Buckley as the new general manager of Transportation Services, who has a history of building bicycling infrastructure with his experiences in Philadelphia, where he constructed 250 miles of trails and doubled the level of bicyclists while halving the traffic accidents involving riders (Kuitenbrouwer, 2013). Philadelphia achieved these dramatic results in part by reducing speed limits throughout the city, adding 2500 bike posts (1500 are metered), and by redesigning streets into “complete streets”, where all users are taken into account and safety is a priority (Buckley, 2013). Buckley says that the reason his department is behind on constructing more of the proposed bicycling lanes is due to a shortage of employees, where currently only 1% of staff is assigned to bicycling infrastructure (Kuitenbrouwer, 2013).

Conclusion

As we have seen, though Toronto deserves praise for some of its bicycle infrastructure initiatives, it clearly could benefit from the type of federal funding that has helped many European cities to grow their bicycling networks. Politics as well seem to be a great deterrent in Toronto’s bicycle lane extensions. As to automobile deterrence, it would appear that with Toronto’s mayor and his professed love for the car it may be a long while yet before anything substantial is done that would change peoples travel behavior. As has been previously revealed, the determinants to car use and the behavior and attitudes of drivers are both greatly ingrained and beyond logic, which should inform future policies if any real change is to be witnessed. It would seem that what is needed to switch car users to transit riders are the creation of incentives to give transit a try, and it would also appear that employers could be of valuable help to accomplishing this. Though Toronto has shown some positive change in its efforts to reduce car parking in the city, there is much room for further improvements. Beyond all else, there appears to be a lack of political will to see through the changes Toronto officials claim to propose. Lastly, while this paper’s focus was on the city of Toronto, it seems that further focus should be placed upon the creation of bicycle lanes in suburban locales within the GTHA that lead to rapid transit, for example to GO train stations, which are already well equipped with bicycle parking. The trouble it seems is reaching these stations by bicycle, through streets clearly made for driving.